5. The End Of Democracy

“Capitalism cannot collapse, it is the natural state of society. Democracy is not the natural state of society; the market is”. We quote these words of Alain Minc (quoted by Ignatio Ramonet in “Géopolitique du Chaos“, Ed. Galilée.1997. P77), not because we agree with the author, but simply because it testifies the unique thought, which carries the premises of the justification of the end of democracy, just like what happened with the Greco-Latin civilisation.

When we use the term “single thought”, we can adopt its definition given by I. Ramonet as “the translation into ideological terms, with universal claim, of the interests of a set of economic forces, especially those of the international capital”. We also add this quote from Cornelius Castoriadis, that “it is unique in that it is the first thought to be an integral non-thought.” These values are known: the market, competition, competitiveness, free trade, globalisation, deregulation, privatisation, liberalisation, -as values that are supposed to bring development, wealth, stability, full employment, etc in short, happiness. It is an insidious belief, based on the lowest instincts and appetites of man, that does not suffer from opponents.

These words of Alain Minc in the current state of human evolution are indicative of a society that has reached the top of the separative part of the curve and cannot conceive that man can function with other values than those of predation. It is a resounding admission of the abandonment of all human ideals proclaimed at the dawn of the humanist period that put such faith in humanity. In the end, it was not humanism that triumphed, but Mammon, the first principle of the combat between Having and Being. In Castoriadis’ words, “a capitalist society is a society that runs towards the wall in every respect, because it does not know how to restrain itself (…) The imaginary of our time is that of unlimited expansion.”

This creed of unique thought is in fact very similar to the one that animates the ancient world after the classical period. Historians have called it “Hellenistic period”, which is located “after Greece” and “before Rome”. It begins with the death of Alexander in -323, which marks the condemnation of democracy in Athens, and ends with the final victory of Octavian on Antony at Actium in -31, the suicide of Cleopatra in -30 and the self-proclamation of Octavian as “divine Augustus”.

For us, 2160 years later, it is the period from the end of the Napoleonic Empire, in 1815, until 2130, a period of three centuries in the middle of which we are now.

Our intention is not so much to dwell on events as on the climate of that time, similar in so many respects to the one we live in today. Initially, the Universal Empire and the Pax Americana (Romana) were not established yet. We are still in the period of the fighting states, more specifically at its peak. This is why, from a certain point of view, this period is particularly critical because it carries a huge potential for destruction because of the separating situation at its extreme (the top of the curve) and the current state of evolution of humanity.

It is always wrong to want to make too precise a connection in the similarities of events, but the parallel here is too striking for us to ignore: more than 2000 years apart, the current world civilisation plays the same scenario as Greco-Roman civilisation. In the role of Rome and Italy, the USA and America in its entirety which unified late in time, just like ancient Italy. In the role of Greek cities, the European nations.

The lines of force which animate them in their reciprocal relations are identical, even if the events, and more specifically the conflicts, do not have the same scale and never repeat themselves identically. So it would be a little vain, even if it is tempting, to want to push the parallel too far by attributing a nation to each city. This will specifically prevent us from attributing the two great wars to the Punic wars or the Macedonian wars, even if the dates correspond. We will also avoid making predictions about the future, except for the underlying key guidelines.

In all that follows, when we indicate a date of the Greco-Roman civilisation, we will put the date which corresponds to our time 2160 years later in parentheses. When we do not specify it, we leave it to the reader to make the connection with the current situation of the world.

The following pages tend to show, over a short period of the curve, that the state of mind of our time is comparable in every respect to that which prevailed during the Hellenistic period. The information given below in support of this proposal and concerning this last period was largely drawn from Peter Green’s excellent book on this period From Alexander to Actium. We strongly recommend reading it to anyone who wants to try to follow the evolution of our society; and to a lesser extent, that of the book Rome et son Empire by MM Christol and Nony.

The first parallel to note is that the United States, like Rome, does not have their own cultural roots and draw their life energy – when they are not looting all the cultural riches using their dominant economic position – one in old Europe, the other in ancient Greece. Roman culture – philosophy, poetry, theatre, painting, architecture – is inspired by or imitated from the Greeks. Apart from their culture of image, which is their own and one which takes profitability and satisfaction of the senses as basic criterion – but can this really be considered as culture? – American writers and artists are totally imbued with European civilisation. Rome and the United States are in fact young civilisations; Greco-Latin and American-European. Both feel a kind of inferiority which they express through a sovereign contempt of the people whose roots they envy. The Romans regarded the Greeks of the Hellenistic period as unscrupulous, unprincipled, greedy and speechless, and, moreover, as bad warriors, and distinguished them from the Greeks of the century of Pericles. Just as the Americans seem to consider current Europe differently than the Europe that existed before the great wars.

The Greeks, for their part, had no better opinion of the Romans. It goes without saying that this did not improve with the sack of Corinth and the deportation of thousands of them. It is unlikely that the judgments of Americans and Europeans on each other are any better today.

The second point of similarity is the rapidity with which these two civilisations became dominant in less than half a century. Rome did not count in the eyes of the successors of Alexander who shared his empire, and until -221 (1939), it was still an unknown power in the ancient world. But from the beginning of the second century, after the defeat of Hannibal in Zama in -202 (1958), Rome was called as arbitrator in the Aegean conflicts.

Some 2160 years later, England, Spain, France and Austria, who shared the Napoleonic Empire, completely ignored America. During World War I, the latter had not really imposed itself as a great power yet. What we called the first Macedonian war of Rome from -215 to ‑205 (1945/1955) was in fact only a war between Hellenes and Macedonians, a reflection of the local politics in which Rome found itself involved, such as the United States in the second world war. Both, in fact, became involved in conflicts only when their interests were threatened. For Rome, it was the trade routes, and for the United States, it was the destruction of its fleet in Pearl Harbor.

But most of all, what makes them so similar is the characteristic atmosphere of the civilisations that arrived at the top of the separative phase of the curve. We will delve into only few some of the major aspects.

First of all it must be noted that decadence is not limited to the dominant civilisations, Rome and the United States, but that it also affects the older civilisations that are driven by the same mercantile climate. In Greece, interest in business began in the early fourth century BC (1760). At this time, the creative genius dies down and Greece turns to the cult of the past. This is the end of the classical era and towards the end of the IVth century, the emergence of philosophies based on the cult of negative values – such as the refusal of suffering and non-participation in the affairs of the city – and on personal interests, with Zeno, Epicurus and Diogenes. They mainly encouraged to take care only of oneself, with all the variants that this attitude can take. And above all, we noticed something characteristic of these peaks of curve; faced with the growing feeling of helplessness – except for a few omnipotent individuals – they condoned fleeing reality. The individual turns to himself, no longer finding his place in the city. This does not happen because it is his final challenge, like Toynbee thought, but because all structures of participation in the organisation of one’s own life and the city have been confiscated by some, or even by the separative phenomenon itself, without anyone feeling responsible. The representative democracies of our time lead to the same disinterest in the life of the city.

These philosophies consecrated the end of the values of the “polis” (the city), which made the reputation of the century of Pericles and were probably from the Greek Middle Ages: courage, honour, and selfless action. These same values, which were the glory of the nobility, to our budding republics were transmitted by our Middle Ages.

Professionals replaced amateurs and obsoleted ideal in all fields: military, political, financial, and artistic. The cult of personality, banned from the time of the “polis”, made its appearance after the Peloponnesian war, at the beginning of IVth century. And it continues growing even today.

To mercantilism, to the absence of real political power and to the intellectual retreat, we must add a rapid development of urbanisation: “Pergamum, Antioch, Seleucia of the Tigris, and especially Alexandria, these great cities centres of international trade, resembled more today’s London, Paris or New York than Pericles’ Athens (…) In Asia, under Alexander’s successors, new Hellenistic cities were produced in series, with orthogonal plans as monotonous as those of the American middle West (…) The agora, having lost its political functions, became a commercial centre surrounded by banks and shopping malls”. Peter Green also reports that indifference to public affairs and the exclusive interest in private and personal matters, coupled with a morbid curiosity for the psychology of passions led to sex becoming the object of increasing attention during the Hellenistic period. But, he says, the essential motive that we notice throughout the Hellenistic era is an unquenchable thirst for power and an insatiable appetite for wealth. In all this, what differences are there with our times?

In the end, it is the same speculative attitude that spares no aspect of life. Land speculation causes the same movement from the countryside towards the suburbs of the cities. The inequality in distribution of wealth is increasingly felt. On the market, as a result of the Roman conquests, there are a multitude of slaves, so much so that the supply exceeds the demand. This situation amplifies inequalities in a way that strangely resembles the consequences of today’s unemployment. In this cosmopolitan universe, it does not matter who we are. What matters is how much we earn.

Creativity gradually disappears in favour of the quest for originality, the expression of violence and a realism that exposes ugliness: in the middle of the second century, Pliny the Elder calls it the cessation of Art, “cessavit deinde ars“. This period was followed by a vast neoclassical reaction with the looting of all Greek treasures by the Romans. The rich Roman collectors paid fortunes to acquire authentic art by the old masters.

As an anecdote, we can add that the planned economy of Ptolemaic Egypt resembled the former USSR in many ways: a totally ineffective monstrous bureaucracy, paralysed under the papyrasserie, where dishonesty raged at all levels. The weights are falsified, the accounts rigged. Extortion was the rule, be it in cash or in kind. Characterised incompetence is generalised, to a point where wheat was spoiled out of neglect by the authorities.

The Roman speculative system, which would have deserved radical reforms, was maintained and pushed to its breaking point by the Romans. Peter Green tells us that they operated with a cynicism so brutal and so effective that they forced the Greek world into bankruptcy in little over a century’s time.

Flaminius proclaimed the freedom of the Greeks in 196 (1964), under the “protection” of Rome. Let us remember that NATO was established in 1949. In less than thirty years (196/-168, 1964/1992), Rome became the undisputed arbiter of the Mediterranean. Since the defeat of Macedonia in Pydna (-168, 1992), its supremacy was no longer disputed. Paul Emile, the victor of Pydna, is said to have left Greece with 150,000 slaves and mountains of art. This victory consecrated the end of Greek civilisation and the victory of money over all other values. But Greece would be crushed once and for all only 22 years later. With the Gulf war, the United States confirmed their military domination over the whole planet.

The second century also sees the appearance of a general wave of religious sentimentality throughout the Mediterranean – what Oswald Spengler called “second religiosity” – associated with a growing influence of luck, Tyche, in both Greek and Roman beliefs and customs, with a disproportionate passion for astrology as corollary. Events are no longer due to God, as it was believed during the periods of faith, but to Tyche, deified chance.

With the next period (-167/-116, 1993/2044), we have no more points of reference. We will therefore content ourselves with giving some indications on the development of Roman civilisation during the few decades that follow Pydna. Peter Green called this period “the destruction of Nations”. During the first part of this period, from Rome’s victory over the last Macedonian king to the sack of Corinth (-167/-146, 1993/2014), it does not seem that Rome had a definite imperialist will (see Kristol’s words at the beginning of this chapter). Some historians cited by Peter Green claim that Greece was a world in full decomposition, waiting for the coup de grâce and that Rome had no difficulty in imposing itself in an already very divided world that had been weakened by infighting.

Peter Green tells us that the official declarations of Rome, denying any imperialist or expansionist will, were sincere, to the extent that they reflected governmental thought, but they were counterbalanced by the speculators’ rapacity, the cynicism, selfishness, and greed of the upstarts, whose wealth was no longer based on the possession of land. Powerful commercial consortia were created. This was the reign of uncontrolled free enterprise. Rome used its army and its administration to protect and develop its economic interests.

But the Greek cities continued to seek Rome’s intervention in internal conflicts, even as Rome increased its grip on Macedonia. The relations then established between Rome and the Greek kingdoms were, for the most part, of a parental type, the Greeks playing the role of brawling children, scatterbrained and undisciplined, while Rome was erected as an ever more severe pater familias. Thus, as if in a teenage revolt, the leaders of the Greek League felt ready to enter a desperate war against Rome as early as 146 BC, to recover a freedom that they seemed to have lost under the economic yoke and the occupation of Macedonia. What follows is known: Mummus, a Roman general, gave carte blanche to his soldiers to plunder and raze Corinth. The “freedom” that Rome had boasted of having brought to the Greeks was buried under the ruins of the city. The same year, Rome razed Carthage (-146, 2014 in the cycle), the only power that dared to challenge its hegemony over the world.

The destruction of Corinth marked the end of Greece’s independence and the beginning of its twilight. During the same period, under the indirect influence of Rome and through the victory of the “free market”, we find the beginning of the decadence of Ptolemaic Egypt and Seleucid Syria, while Rome entered its triumphant phase (-116/-30, 2044/2130 in the cycle) whose climax would be reached with the god-emperor Augustus.

In Greece, paradoxically, the philosophers of classical Greece had demanded “the individual facing himself” as a criterion of discernment. But this was established without the support of the structures of the city (polis). However, this much-sought-after situation, which brings one to face his loneliness, proved difficult to bear and turned into a desperate search for identity and sharing. Undoubtedly this is one of the many signs of the culminating points of the separative epochs: the man who rejected the sacred and the gods finds himself in front of a gulf of loneliness that becomes more and more unbearable to him every day.

The destruction of Corinth, which is, give or take a few years, at the top of our curve, marks an important turning point in morals. From that time onwards, the search for power and for the satisfaction of the senses become the only values of existence, with, of course, an unbridled desire to possess. Speculators rush towards anything that can be a source of quick profits and from -170 (1990) onwards, the East becomes the bearer of such promises.

Peter Green tells us that Rome often practices an economic policy of simple predation, eliminating its rivals through the artificial creation of competitors or pure and simple destruction. He also tells us that Rome knows an influx of riches such that, after -168, the Roman citizens are exempted from direct taxes. The Roman, citizen-king, now lives as a prince when he is rich, and is assisted when he is poor.

Colossal fortunes appear in the business community, most often from juicy investments and exorbitant usury loans. Brutus, Caesar’s murderer, practiced a rate of 48% while the legal rate was 12%. In fact, just like today, these fortunes prove to be indispensable when one wants to participate in the political life because of the cost of the electoral campaigns. Conversely, peasants and craftsmen are ruined by endless wars, the increase of the cost of life, the devaluation of money and competition between the Provinces. Legal and illegal violence increases day by day. The overabundance of slaves becomes a real problem. The servile wars, those of the slaves, began as early as 135 BC (2025). Agriculture is undermined by speculation. Finding themselves without work, the peasants emigrate to the cities where they are assisted. The attempt of the Gracchi -133 (2027) to solve the agrarian problem by distributing land to the peasants lead to a century of civil wars, which killed the republic.

In the field of art, once the shameless looting of the Greek world ceased, an art market similar to ours was organised. No aspect of the end of republican Rome, P. Green tells us, however citing Pollit, gives a more modern impression: “buyers had more enthusiasm than taste and more money than enthusiasm.” Even religion does not escape commerce; it takes a contractual aspect of bargaining with the gods: the god must grant what is asked if the corresponding offering has been made.

To end this rapprochement between Greco-Roman antiquity and our time, we must mention the topic of the Olympic Games which might suggest that the interval of 2160 years is not respected. They were indeed founded in -776 (1384), and were to be celebrated in honour of Zeus. Courage, selflessness, and loyalty were the values that animated them. Also, in our opinion, they have nothing to do with the modern Olympics, honoured in 1896 by Pierre de Coubertin, and echoes the Roman circus games. The latter, which appeared around -250 (1910), were intended, according to the scornful words of Juvenal, for an idle society to which we must grant “panem et circences” (bread and games).

Contrary to what we can see today, where they are largely under the influence of financial stakes, the spirit of the Greek Olympic Games resembled more that of the tournaments of the Middle Ages.

To close this chapter, we list below the main findings on our society that Ignatio Ramonet notes in his book Geopolitics of Chaos, for the similarity they offer with ancient Rome. The United States and Rome carry the same image: country of freedom, hospitality and tolerance. Both have seen the following phenomena develop within them:

• Rise of inequality and discrimination of all kinds: social, economic, racial.
• Globalisation of the economy and law of the market.
• Specialisation of trades.
• Appearance, through wealth, of new masters of the world.
• Rising violence and insecurity.
• Policy of speculation and predation.
• Slippage of culture into the vulgar and the sensational, mass culture, worship of leisure.
• Anxiety of the citizens.
• Progression of the irrational, and belief in luck, which replaces the sacred.
• Financing of the wars of the Empire by the other nations (see gulf war).
• Mediations carried out in their own interest.
• Standardisation, homogeneity, uniformisation.
• Condemnation of any hint of resistance or – dissent in the name of realism and pragmatism.
• Gradual abandonment of the values of the republic and of democratic conquests.
• Agony of culture, subject to mercantilism.
• Loss of collective dreams and individualistic withdrawal.
• Religiosity without God, that is, religions without the Sacred.

We are not alone in noting this resemblance of the Roman Empire and the present times. The Monde Diplomatique (August 1997) dedicates two full pages, from two books by historians of the late antiquity (M. I. Rostovtzeff and Peter Brown). However, the parallels that they examine – urban brigandage, various abuses, … – should culminate, in our opinion, only in two or three centuries, if our basic assumption turns out to be accurate and if man does not change his attitude. with the decadence of the American Empire.